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Harmful Beneficence 
 
Beneficence can be significant to moral action but criteria for good beneficence is rarely 
discussed. Much work has focused on how extensive the demands are on agents to be beneficent and on 
agents’ motivations for beneficence.1  There has been little direct attention to the relationship between 
benefactor and beneficiary. The argument here is that serious deficiencies exist in the view that 
benefactors should focus primarily on satisfying another’s self-chosen ends. A narrow focus on the 
attempt to help someone satisfy her ends misses the harmful effects that benefactors can have on a 
dependent beneficiary's ability to choose freely from her own values and to utilize her internal and 
external resources in future action.  
 This paper will argue that beneficence that involves a relationship of dependence between 
benefactor and beneficiary cannot aim only at promoting that beneficiary's good, narrowly conceived as 
meeting her self-chosen ends; it must also preserve the current conditions that the beneficiary depends on 
for her free agency. A concern for free agency in beneficence goes beyond whether one satisfies 
someone’s freely chosen ends and respects her internal capacity to set ends. It must also involve the 
beneficiary’s overall conception of her good and the resources she depends upon in realizing that 
conception. When a benefactor fails to understand or respect the larger set of values a beneficiary may 
have, fails to account for a beneficiary’s fuller conception of her own good, or disregards the wider side 
effects of her action, the choice of means that benefactor uses are much more likely to undermine the 
beneficiary’s independently controlled resources.  When a beneficiary depends on these resources for 
future choices, these side effects can undermine her free agency in the future.  
                                                 
1 Questions about the proper motive for beneficence are raised in Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of 
Modern Ethical Theories” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 453-466; Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics 
Almost Without Apology, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). For work on how demanding 
beneficence should be, cf. Richard J. Arneson, “Moral Limits on the Demands of Beneficence?” in The 
Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, Deen K. Chatterjee, ed. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 33-58; Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Hurley, “Fairness and Beneficence,” Ethics 115 (2003), 
pp. 841-864. 
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 Free agency is understood here as a person's unimpeded ability to deliberate about her values, to 
choose from those values, and to make those choices effective in action. The thinner notion of free agency 
overlaps with the thicker notion of autonomy; below, I will draw on ideas about autonomy that are 
relevant to the more minimal notion of free agency.2  
 Free agency is often a clearer objective than autonomy when we interact with others, particularly 
in cases of beneficence. It is often hard to know whether another person has satisfied the necessary 
criteria for autonomy on many views. More importantly, we have much less power to influence—for 
better or worse—some of the psychological conditions necessary for others’ autonomy.3 We can, 
however, have a significant influence on the conditions for someone's free agency. Our ultimate hope 
should be that others are fully autonomous, and we must do what we can to preserve and respect their 
autonomy. However, a focus on free agency more directly aims at the basic idea that (barring exceptional 
circumstances) we must prevent our actions from impeding a person's freedom to control her own life. 
Although a person's deliberation is also to some extent private, there are still many familiar ways we can 
impede free deliberation and choice. We may directly or indirectly threaten a person, manipulate or bully 
her, induce guilt or shame, threaten to withhold something she desperately needs, or cause her to regard 
the help we offer as conditional on her acceptance of the values we prefer.  If we do so, it is not far-
fetched to suppose we tamper with her ability to make her own choices. The argument below will 
consider more subtle influences one person can have on another's deliberation and also show that a focus 
on free agency makes clearer the relationship between the set of options a person has and her freedom.  
                                                 
2 The intersection between free agency and autonomy entails that impeding someone's free agency is 
impeding her autonomy. We can also promote someone's autonomy by promoting her free agency, but 
there may be conditions for autonomy that promoting free agency leaves untouched. The point is that 
autonomy is a broader notion than is necessary here. 
3 For example, a number of views of autonomy require certain procedures for choice that involve 
reflection and/or endorsement. Because these are dependent on private mental states, our ability to tell 
whether another person has satisfied these criteria is minimal. Although we can encourage others’ 
reflection and endorsement, it will be very difficult for one person to directly promote these in another. 
For a general account of what different views of autonomy require, see Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, 
Gender, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 19-25. 
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 I will begin with a minimal conception of beneficence. An action is beneficent if it is intended to 
benefit another person with an aim to enhancing her good, primarily by satisfying her desires, helping her 
realize what she values, meeting her needs, promoting her interests or protecting her from harm. A 
beneficent agent's intention to promote the beneficiary’s well-being is a substantial part of her reason for 
acting.  Beneficence has moral content. The auto mechanic who fixes your car helps you realize one of 
your ends, but her action is not beneficent when her reason is simply to do her job and be paid for it.  At 
the same time, she might beneficently fix your headlight for free when she realizes you have emptied your 
checking account to pay for repairs on your clutch.  
Typically, the kind of beneficence we most admire also involves an attitude of benevolence in the 
form of goodwill, care and concern, and the agent's interest in the beneficiary's well-being.4 Beneficence 
need not be benevolent to be good beneficence. The argument here applies both to benevolent and non-
benevolent beneficence but, in the main example I offer below, Albert Schweitzer is benevolent. 
Benevolence offers benefactors a strong motive to attend to the effects of their actions on beneficiaries, 
but the example shows that it does not necessarily protect beneficiaries from harm to their free agency. 
Obviously, a benefactor who is malevolent, callous, or negligent is more likely to fail at good 
beneficence. However, well-intentioned and benevolent benefactors are very capable of inadvertently 
doing significant harm.  
I am concerned here with non-paternalistic beneficence, where the ends, needs, interests, 
protection and so on are all chosen by the beneficiary herself, and she welcomes the beneficent action. 
Even in such cases, I will argue beneficence can fail in a crucial respect when the benefactor is 
insufficiently aware of the harmful effects his actions have on the beneficiary's options for future 
deliberation and action. This is true whether or not the beneficiary does enjoy some benefit from the 
action. Section One contains a definition of the type of dependence that occurs most often in beneficence, 
                                                 
4 Some discussions of benevolence include benevolent action, or what I am calling beneficence, within 
the concept of benevolence. Cf. Yuval Livnat, “On the Nature of Benevolence,” The Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 35 (2004), pp. 304-317. The distinction between beneficence and benevolence is meant to 
highlight the fact that some beneficence does not include benevolence. 
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and offers an example of harmful beneficence. Section Two presents conditions for good beneficence: 
beneficence that preserves free agency and shows respect for beneficiaries. 
1. Beneficence and Dependence 
 I focus on beneficence that involves a relationship of dependence between benefactor and 
beneficiary. Dependence is frequently a significant feature of beneficence. Those most in need of help are 
often required to depend on others to satisfy their central ends. If the free agency of dependent 
beneficiaries is threatened by beneficence, this raises a serious question for moral theories that require us 
to help those who cannot meet their own needs. The conditions for good beneficence offered here show 
that harmful beneficence in cases of dependence can be avoided, although this requires more of agents 
than is often assumed.5  
 The argument is not that free agency is more likely or enhanced when a person relies on herself to 
satisfy her ends. Few people can satisfy all their ends without help from others. Dependence is a 
necessary part of many relationships we deeply value. There is nothing inherently desirable about 
avoiding it.   
 Dependence is a matter of degree. In the weakest sense, we are always dependent on others not to 
interfere with us as we carry out our ends, and almost always dependent upon them to cooperate with us. 
The more robust form of dependence within beneficent relationships is the dependence an autonomous 
person, P1, has when first, P1 believes it necessary that someone besides herself, P2, contribute to the 
realization of a central element in P1’s conception of her own good (that is, P2’s action is a necessary 
means to a central end P1 has). Second, P1 does not have recourse to other sources that would provide 
comparable means to the end (that is, P2’s action is the sole means currently available). Third, P1 has an 
expectation that her end will be satisfied by P2’s particular action or set of actions. Thus, a relationship of 
robust dependence exists in beneficence when P1’s good is significantly affected by the actions of another 
person, P2, and P1 necessarily relies on P2 for this result.  Dependence of this kind can occur between 
                                                 
5 The harms described here may occur when dependence is not present. Dependence is not necessary for 
these harms, but it increases the risk. 
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strangers but also occurs in personal relationships, for example, between friends, parents and children, 
long-term partners, or teachers and students. Material needs that a person cannot satisfy through her own 
agency can be the cause of one person’s dependence on another, but this is not the only dependent 
relationship that is appropriate for beneficence. Someone may be beneficent by providing us with 
information we need to act, or helping us realize which ends would better promote our own good. 
Beneficence involving dependence is neither better nor worse than beneficence where a 
beneficiary’s acceptance of help is optional—in the sense that her end is less pressing (and therefore not a 
central end) or she has recourse to other means to her end.  Nor does beneficence always involve robust 
dependence. We can help someone to lighten her burden or show concern for her even when she could 
help herself. When someone’s beneficence also involves your dependence it is because you cannot refuse 
that beneficence except at some significant cost: You cannot realize the end without the help that is 
offered (unless you get similar help from someone else). Thus, you are not robustly dependent on me 
when I give you advice on caring for your premature infant if you can get that information on your own. 
But if you depend on my beneficence alone to adequately care for, feed, clothe or inoculate your baby, 
you do become so dependent. 
How can beneficence undermine free agency? The example that follows has features that are not 
uncommon when beneficence is called for: A beneficent agent with expertise and access to resources, and 
beneficiaries whose poverty and oppression make it hard to realize their ends. The very features that make 
a person greatly in need of beneficence also make her more vulnerable to a loss of free agency, when her 
resources are damaged and her options are narrowed.  
 The Alsatian doctor Albert Schweitzer, as portrayed in the movie Le Grand Blanc de Lamberéné, 
dedicates his life to benefiting the people living in Gabon. Although he is less famed now, in his time 
Schweitzer was thought of by many in Europe and the Americas as a great humanitarian and a 
paradigmatic benefactor. The film portrays Schweitzer as a sympathetic, but ultimately tragic, figure. We 
see that, although Schweitzer's actions do unjustified and unnecessary harm to the free agency of 
beneficiaries, he makes significant sacrifices to be of service to the Gabonese, has deeply benevolent 
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feelings towards them, and successfully helps them satisfy some of their central ends, by providing health 
care and other material aid.6  
 The problem with Schweitzer's actions is not primarily paternalism, understood as providing 
benefits to a person that she would refuse or reject, or as benefiting someone unable to make a free or 
informed choice.7 The Gabonese adults in the film are able to make free and informed choices and they 
welcome Schweitzer’s medical treatment and material aid. Schweitzer does engage in one major act of 
paternalism: He gives the tribal leader Mata a placebo, rather than telling him that he is dying. This 
assuages Mata's fear and temporarily alleviates his suffering, but also prevents him from adequate 
preparation for his funeral ceremony. Otherwise, Schweitzer does not force the Gabonese to accept help 
that they do not want and does not directly contravene their choices.   
 Nevertheless, Schweitzer's beneficence creates a significant difficulty for some, particularly with 
respect to the goal of political independence. The film presents political independence as important to 
almost all the Gabonese, even if some concealed their approval of it to avoid annoying Schweitzer. 
Schweitzer was not opposed to anti-colonialism on principle. Rather, he did not understand its importance 
to the Gabonese and occasionally displayed a kind of annoyed bafflement about their passion for it.   
 One issue of conflict concerned resources. Schweitzer resisted the desire of the local people for 
greater control over the clinic, and, in spite of his sympathy for their suffering, he was not sympathetic to 
their hope to acquire the skills he himself had.  Thus, one issue is that he did not fully appreciate their 
desire to develop and exercise their own talents. A second issue is that Schweitzer's beneficence causes a 
division in the community between those who sought the material goods from Europe that he provided 
and those who thought it better, for economic and political reasons, to focus on economic self-sufficiency. 
One problem for those accepting the goods Schweitzer offered is that they became less focused on 
meeting their own economic needs and they were not able to engage in the usual economic give and take 
that they had traditionally relied upon as subsistence farmers prior to Schweitzer's arrival. By giving up 
                                                 
6 Le Grand Blanc de Lambéréne, directed by Bassek ba Kohbia, 1995. I do not claim that the film 
represents the historical Schweitzer correctly. 
7 Cf. Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism,” The Monist (56), 1972, pp. 64-84. 
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the cooperative and reciprocal agricultural practices they had previously engaged in, their standing 
entitlement to the assistance of others was severely weakened. As they were ultimately interdependent 
with others in the larger community even with the goods Schweitzer provided, this later put them at a 
disadvantage. It became harder for them to realize their ends when others, who now mistrusted them, 
refused their cooperation. Further, surrounding communities who were focused on the self-sufficient 
model became alienated from those perceived of as relying on Schweitzer. In losing the help of these 
communities, those close to Schweitzer lost a significant resource they needed after the colonial period, 
when self-sufficient farming became the primary economic option.8 
 Schweitzer's inability to recognize the importance of eliminating colonialism to those around him 
was a major failing. Beneficiaries' needs and ends are nested within the broader context of their lives. 
Ignoring or misunderstanding this context is a hazard for both benefactors and beneficiaries. In 
Schweitzer’s case, the issues that arose about how to develop and use resources can be explained by the 
desire of the colonized for economic self-sufficiency and political self-respect. One aspect of colonial 
rule—in Africa and elsewhere—was the view that those ruled were inferior to Europeans and thus 
incapable of economic and political self-determination. Further, the colonial economic system was 
designed to provide raw material for European economies. Cheap raw materials were sent to Europe but 
colonies depended on expensive imports of finished goods. Those hoping for self-rule therefore believed 
that economic self-sufficiency through a focus on providing for their own needs would facilitate political 
independence by removing economic dependence on Europe. Thus, those within the movement aimed to 
remove not only the external causes of incapacity, such as economic dependence on Europe and European 
political domination, but also to overcome internalized conceptions of inferiority. These goals were 
linked, in that economic self-sufficiency, particularly during the transition away from colonialism, would 
                                                 
8 Dependence on material aid can make beneficiaries vulnerable to later economic changes. E.g., this 
occurs when food provided for famine relief competes with locally grown food. The drop in prices can 
sometimes make it impossible for farmers to raise the money they need to plant for the next year.  See 
Frances Moore Lappe, World Hunger: Twelve Myths (New York: Grove Press, 1998), p. 134. 
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both increase the possibility of independence and also decrease the sense of internalized inferiority that 
colonialism caused.9 
 In this context, why did Schweitzer provide inadequate and harmful beneficence in spite of his 
clear desire not to harm those he worked for? The explanations are interrelated. First, Schweitzer had an 
extremely limited understanding of the Gabonese perspective, their culture and way of life, their values 
and the place of some of their values in their overall conception of their good. Bassa, a character close to 
Schweitzer, points out that although Schweitzer has treated thousands of patients, he has made no attempt 
to learn their language. He made insufficient effort to understand the particulars of people’s lives and this 
kept him from seeing the wider effect his actions had on those lives. Second, Schweitzer does not attend 
to the possible psychological impact that his relative wealth and power might have on those with far 
fewer options. He unintentionally leaves some with the belief that his beneficence would be more secure 
if they complied with his preferences, for example by not openly supporting the anti-colonialist 
movement. 
I have so far focused primarily on benefactors, but to understand the impact of dependence in 
beneficent relationships on free agency, it is also necessary to consider the effects on the beneficiary. The 
limitations on options that make beneficence so important to beneficiaries also threaten to lead to even 
narrower options in the future when the benefactor's action impedes the use of other resources. When 
beneficiaries are dependent, beneficence sometimes interferes with their internal (self-respect, 
confidence) or external (economic, social or political) resources.  It is well known that international aid to 
underdeveloped countries sometimes fails when the aid has an analogous type of unintended side effect 
on resources. 10  
                                                 
9 Cf., Edmund J. Keller, “Africa in Transition: Facing the Challenge of Globalization, Harvard 
International Review, (29), 2007, pp. 46-51; Valentine Udoh James, “The Importance of Self-Sufficiency 
To African Countries”, in Valentine Udoh James, Sustainable Development in Third World Countries: 
Applied and Theoretical Perspectives (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishers), pp. 142-154; Zine 
Mugabane, Bringing The Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
10 Cf. Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (New York: Zed 
Books, 2002). 
 9 
A second aspect of the problem is less often noticed: the benefactor's choice can have effects on 
the beneficiary's resources (whether deliberate or inadvertent) that can interfere with the beneficiary’s 
ability to freely deliberate and choose. Below, I will argue that perhaps the most worrying effect of 
Schweitzer's beneficence was its effect on the deliberative process of those he tried to help. When 
beneficiaries have limited resources, dependence can threaten their deliberative options in three ways: by 
restricting their autonomy of action, by interfering with the formation of choices, and by reducing their 
self-esteem.   
 First, dependence can impede our ability to act, for example if we unnecessarily give up one 
resource in order to acquire a resource through beneficence. Losing one resource for another may not 
always be problematic; sometimes such shifts in resources can have long-term benefits.  It can be a harm 
when it occurs unnecessarily, for example when it is not a necessary condition for the benefit received but 
occurs because the benefactor fails to recognize his impact on resources. A reduction in our options can 
also affect deliberation. When circumstances frequently frustrate the realization of our ends or 
significantly narrow our options, this can sometimes affect our capacity to deliberate freely and choose in 
the future.  
In understanding how some kinds of dependence can undermine free agency, it is useful to draw a 
further distinction between what Gerald Dworkin calls autonomy of judgment and autonomy of action, 
two notions closely related to what I have called free agency.11 Autonomy of judgment is the free exercise 
of the capacity that allows one to both judge and choose. It is therefore incompatible with brainwashing, 
hypnosis, compulsion, deceit, insanity and anything else that interferes with the voluntary status of an 
agent’s judgment. Autonomy of action is the freedom to follow the course one has decided upon.  It is 
usually assumed that autonomy of judgment is a prerequisite for autonomy of action, but less noticed are 
the complex ways these interrelate. Loosely, autonomy of judgment is the absence of internal constraints 
on a person’s deliberation and choice, and autonomy of action is the absence of external constraints on 
                                                 
11 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Moral Autonomy,’ in Morals, Science and Sociality, T. Engelhardt and D. Callahan, 
eds. (Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1978), pp. 156-170. 
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her actions.12  Thus, a political prisoner might still have autonomy of judgment. She can autonomously 
judge that her imprisonment is unjust, that it is carried out by an unjust regime, and that, when she is free, 
she will work to overthrow that regime. However, she does not have autonomy of action. That form of 
autonomy has been restricted by her jailers.13  
We can conceptually separate the notions of autonomy of action and judgment, but they are 
importantly interdependent. The negation or absence of one affects the presence of the other. What is 
most relevant to the issue of dependence is that the belief that you lack autonomy of action often erodes 
your autonomy of judgment. The expectation that you will rarely (or never) get to carry out your ends or 
act on your values can have a serious effect on your deliberative process.  To take a case that does not 
involve beneficence: If I believe, like Charlotte Vale in Now, Voyager, that I am doomed to spend my life 
placating my ill domineering mother for fear any rebellion will cause her to disown me or to die, I am 
unlikely to formulate many independent projects if I regard such projects as impossible to carry out.14 
When there are extreme, seemingly insurmountable constraints on my range of options, it may be more 
rational to resign myself to my circumstances to avoid the depression and frustration the absence of 
freedom causes. Gradually, situations where our options are exceedingly narrow can erode our 
willingness to reflect on other possibilities or to develop plans and values of our own. 
Long-term restrictions on political and social freedom can also erode our inclination to deliberate 
freely and to act on our decisions. Perhaps this is why autonomy of judgment receives much more 
theoretical attention in the philosophical literature: in a sense, it is what gives autonomy of action its 
                                                 
12 See also S.I. Benn, ‘Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society (1976), pp. 109-30. 
13 Locke famously claims that a person held in prison with the door unlocked is not free when someone 
has caused him to believe that the door is locked and thus he cannot escape. Such a person lacks 
autonomy of judgment and thus autonomy of action. When Odysseus chooses to be bound to the mast in 
order to hear the Sirens without jumping overboard, he has autonomy of judgment without autonomy of 
action. (Later, upon hearing the Sirens, he lacks both sorts of autonomy.) Locke’s example shows that we 
should assume a fairly wide notion of constraint when considering autonomy of action. A person is 
constrained from acting not only when she is forcibly prevented from acting, but also when she lacks the 
resources, both epistemic and material, to act. Unless this wide notion of constraint on freedom is granted, 
we would have to say that a person trapped at the bottom of a well is free to rise to the surface, because 
she could do this if she had a ladder. 
14 Now, Voyager, directed by Irving Rapper, 1942. 
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importance. We tend to be troubled by restrictions on autonomy of action when a person is capable of 
thinking and deciding for herself. Yet, an agent who has autonomy of judgment can conceivably exercise 
it even when a range of actional options is temporarily closed to her.15 Schweitzer had a similar effect on 
the autonomy of judgment of some Gabonese. The background condition of colonialism already impeded 
their options, but his beneficence unnecessarily made things worse for them, even if he also helped them 
in certain respects.  
Those most attached to Schweitzer's beneficence were reluctant to consider participating in the 
anti-colonialist movement, in spite of their underlying sympathy for the cause. They feared doing so 
would risk Schweitzer's ire and thus his continued medical and material help. Some also wanted to avoid 
seeming ungrateful. The goal of greater economic self-sufficiency, which was part of the movement, also 
presented a dilemma to those who felt dependent on Schweitzer's largess: what if he withdrew his help 
and they lost the European goods he offered? What if the movement failed and he was no longer available 
to protect them from hunger in their new way of life? They would be much worse off. Thus, they felt 
unable to deliberate fully about options they might have had were they free from these concerns about 
losing Schweitzer's favor or seeming ungrateful.   
 Why, we might ask, did they not directly ask Schweitzer to promise to continue his beneficence, 
or that he not favor those who were not openly political? A problematic feature of relationships of 
beneficence in cases of economic or other kinds of inequality is that negotiation is very risky for 
                                                 
15 The argument here is not that lack of autonomy of action immediately forecloses autonomy of 
judgment, but that most adults will not form ends they regard as unrealizable. We form ends in light of 
our options. When our options narrow significantly in the sense that our power to act is curtailed, as when 
we have few resources, we have much less reason to reflect on choices. However, even when our 
autonomy of action is restricted, we can exercise autonomy of judgment in forming attitudes about our 
lives. Further, retaining autonomy of judgment can be important in cases where liberty is restricted 
because one may have later opportunities to resist these restrictions. Slaves in the American South 
provide a significant example. By utilizing a small range of autonomy of action (for example, by learning 
how to read) during their captivity, they often increased their opportunity for escape, as well as their 
opportunity to work towards the liberation of other slaves.  See Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class 
(New York: Random House, 1981); Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (New 
York: Collier, 1962). At the same time the restriction on options also made avoidance of reflection on 
choices a kind of survival strategy for many slaves, as explored by Tony Morrison in Beloved (New York: 
Knopf, 1987).  
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beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are aware they have no right to the goods the benefactor offers. Negotiation 
may be unwise when those benefactors are the only secure means to one's ends. This problem can be 
addressed, but only when benefactors are sufficiently aware of the effects of their attitudes and actions.  
 Beneficence that involves dependence can interfere with the beneficiary's formation of values and 
choices. While it is exacerbated by restrictions on autonomy of action, this effect can also occur when 
autonomy of action is not directly curtailed. In such situations, this happens in three ways: it affects the 
preferences of the dependent person, it interferes with her reflection on and choice of values, and it 
reduces her self-esteem.  
The first effect that beneficence can have on deliberation is that the goods offered or promised 
(for example, health care, food, education, and access to technology) potentially affect the future 
preferences of those who receive them. While this is not immediately problematic, it can become so if the 
future satisfaction of these preferences creates too great an incentive for the beneficiary to relinquish 
resources she currently relies on to realize what she values. For example, to give the Kayapo Indians of 
the Brazilian Amazon the opportunity to document a plight partly caused by settlers’ encroachment on 
their land, the owner of the Body Shop chain gave them a television and video equipment. They had not 
been exposed to television and had no access to it, and so they sold some land to buy a satellite dish. The 
suggestion here is not that the Kayapo did not make their choice freely. However, if they were to 
impoverish themselves to satisfy present preferences they could curtail their future autonomy of action. 
 A second effect that undermines free agency is that the great need for certain goods, combined 
with the benefactor’s (unstated or even unconscious) expectation that the recipient will take up particular 
values and attitudes, can interfere with the beneficiary’s deliberation in several ways: (a) he may not 
reflect adequately on his values and attitudes out of concern that doing so would lead him to display 
values and attitudes the benefactor will disapprove of; (b) he may not believe he is free to choose his own 
values and ends without penalty (e.g., the loss of beneficence); or (c) he may decide to adopt values and 
attitudes he believes will better secure the benefactor's inclination to benefit him, e.g., because such 
values and attitudes will make the benefactor more likely to approve of him or take an interest in him.   
 13 
 In the Schweitzer case, the recipients of his generosity developed a feeling of gratitude and 
loyalty toward Schweitzer. This made it difficult to disagree with him when their values and ends 
conflicted with his own personal values (for example, regarding politics or social mores) or with his 
conception of their situation. When the beneficent agent is offering a good that greatly increases well-
being (e.g., clearly rising living standards, greater social status) or something nearly impossible to forego 
(e.g., protection of one’s children against deadly disease) the beneficiary will have a greater—and harder 
to resist—incentive to display the attitudes and values that might please the agent. 
 Even when we are not desperate for survival, mere social interdependence can have a problematic 
effect on our values. It is fairly common, for example, for people to unreflectively internalize values that 
will make them successful with others, e.g., their employers. However, relationships of dependence can 
affect values even more profoundly when people have very minimal power in comparison to those they 
depend upon and they lack the needed resources to change their situation. This can be illustrated by 
imagining how the ‘Deferential Wife’ described by Thomas Hill ended up in her predicament.  Although 
this is not a case of beneficence, it illustrates the penalty on free choice that another person can exact 
when we are dependent on them and have few other options. As Hill describes the Deferential Wife, she 
is “utterly devoted to serving her husband.”  So,    
She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever 
he is in the mood…She loves her husband but her conduct is not simply an expression of love. 
She is happy, but she does not subordinate herself as a means to happiness…On the contrary, she 
tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and when she does she counts them as less 
important than her husband’s.16 
 In my re-imagined version of the example, the Deferential Wife was once a young woman who 
desired economic security, a socially accepted form of sexual companionship, social status, and freedom 
                                                 
16 Thomas Hill, “Servility and Self-Respect,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 5. Hill’s example is not about the effects of dependence but about the absence 
of self-respect. My addition to the example shows that the abuse of power within dependent relationships 
can cause loss of self-respect for the dependent person. 
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from unwanted sexual advances, but could only satisfy them through marriage to a husband who could 
provide them. Unfortunately, the seemingly jovial fellow she married soon turned out to be the 
Domineering Husband. As she gets older, the Domineering Husband threatens to leave her when she fails 
to reflect his values and meet all his needs. Since she fears losing the benefits of the life with her husband, 
and the life of a middle-aged divorcée involves economic hardship and loss of social status, she begins to 
display the attitudes and values that will maintain the relationship. After a while, she no longer bothers to 
reflect on her adopted interests, values or ideals or those she might develop independently of her husband. 
Her acquired values, combined with her belief that she cannot realize her aims (or perhaps even survive) 
without him, cause her to adopt the belief that the proper role of a woman is to serve her family.17 
 Applied to beneficence, the Deferential Wife example illustrates a danger of beneficence 
involving dependence, particularly under the conditions of inequality that are likely to exist between 
benefactors and beneficiaries. This potential for distortion of beneficiaries’ deliberative process relates to 
a well-known problem in humanitarian aid. The heads of foreign non-governmental aid organizations in 
the Third World may be more likely to assist those they regard as sharing their political or religious 
outlook; this naturally increases incentives for people to adopt that outlook.  Particularly when people are 
desperate, their perceptions of benefactors’ beliefs, values and attitudes can alter the sorts of plans and 
values they adopt so that they conform to the (real or perceived) expectations of their benefactors. 
 The concern that one person's actions may change another person's values in ways they would not 
endorse requires significant qualification. Our values can be changed in ways that are not the immediate 
result of reflective rational processes, for example through experiences or through exposure to those with 
different values. In other words, we may not endorse changes to our values until they have already 
changed, e.g., as a result of personal experience or information about alternatives. Nor are all actions 
intended to change others' values disrespectful of free agency or otherwise problematic. Education, for 
example, may change people's values—note how people who benefit from the oppression of others fear 
certain kinds of education.  Thus a change in values, per se, is not a serious worry from the point of view 
                                                 
17 Hill, “Servility and Self Respect,” p. 6. 
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of free agency; attempts to change people's values can respect and even enhance free agency when they 
do not involve manipulation or unjust coercion, and instead rely on persuasion, education, or widening 
their set of experiences. 
 A further objection arises, however: some people's values may be disturbing enough to justify our 
pressuring them to change those values or offering them incentives within beneficence to change those 
values. Sometimes this issue is easily resolved. Often, no good can come from a beneficent relationship 
with someone whose values are repellent. And there is, of course, no duty for benefactors to act contrary 
to their own values. In other cases, we may want to help people but find it impossible to respect some of 
their values. Some people value norms, roles and practices that oppress women. Or, a benefactor may 
work in a community that practices female genital mutilation. Both of these undermine women's free 
agency. If our role as a benefactor gives us a certain power and influence over people is it wrong for us to 
pressure them to change oppressive values and practices in order to promote someone else’s free agency? 
Note that an attempt to change the practice of female genital mutilation within communities would be for 
the immediate benefit of children even if the harm occurs throughout their adult life, making this 
primarily a kind of paternalistic beneficence. The wide influence a benefactor may sometimes have over 
people’s lives can enable such acts of paternalism, even when the primary beneficence is not paternalistic. 
 The problem here lies not in the failure to respect whatever value people see in female genital 
mutilation or oppressive practices generally; values that cause harm to others are not worthy of respect. 
Instead, efforts that entirely bypass people's free agency are usually doomed to fail and may even be 
hazardous for those one hopes to benefit. Providing incentives to parents not to mutilate their daughters 
could potentially protect the daughters, but could lead to other harms: both children and parents could 
suffer violence at the hands of those who support the practice or the daughters could be abandoned by 
their parents or ostracized by their community.18 Pressure, or even shaming, might induce people to adopt 
                                                 
18 It’s tempting to say that a person fleeing genital mutilation is better off away from their community. In 
some cases, they might be. However, it is only in truly extraordinary cases where women in this situation 
have other resources or options. Unless one is able to provide these, an action to prevent the practice of 
FGM has to take into account these potential harms.  It is very difficult for women to get political asylum 
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other values, but this process, to be successful in removing harm, requires a change in behavior. This will 
not occur unless they eventually come to endorse the value. A more reliable way to address people's 
desire to engage in practices harmful to women will almost invariably require that some (particularly the 
women) be willingly involved and committed to this goal. Here, the responsibility to fully understand 
people’s circumstances and attend to the likely effects of certain actions on their lives is indispensable. 
 Something similar can be said about a benefactor’s attempt to address the oppression of women. 
In principle, it is not objectionable to state one's honest disapproval. Disagreeing with people is not 
necessarily disrespecting them, particularly when it is clear we will we not penalize them for their views. 
A trickier issue arises when people attempt to give or withhold desperately needed resources in order to 
pressure people into transforming their values or when beneficiaries fear they might lose benefits as a 
result of benefactor disapproval, as in the Schweitzer case. It is worth remembering that the aim that is 
justified here is to remove the harm to those oppressed, not merely to give them or their oppressors better 
values. If the goal is to remove oppression-related harms people suffer, this may be next to impossible 
without involving their free agency in some way.  
With respect to the oppression of women, the responsibility to listen, give credence to and 
understand the views of the women concerned is unavoidable. The benefactor must consider what 
beneficiaries believe will better or worsen their situation and she has a responsibility to weigh most 
seriously what they say about their own lives. A more promising method than pressure is one often used 
by international aid organizations: Provide aid directly to women and provide aid that targets twomen's 
needs. Increasing women's access to resources is a mechanism to help them overcome their oppression. 
This aid is usually not tied to requirements about how the women live or what values they have. Rather, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
to protect themselves or their daughters from FGM. See Timothy Egan, “An Ancient Practice and a 
Mother’s Asylum Plea,” The New York Times, March 4, 1994. For a discussion of difficulties suffered by 
those who oppose the practice of FGM, including social shunning, see Tina Rosenberg, “Mutilating 
Africa’s Daughters: Laws Unenforced, Practices Unchanged,” The New York Times, July 5, 2004. 
Rosenberg’s article also states that progress in ending the practice has been made in Mali by local groups 
and the involvement of religious leaders. 
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decreases their oppression indirectly by increasing their economic and social status.19 When we find 
ourselves in the position of a benefactor who has a higher social, economic or political status than those 
we try to help, it may be tempting to forget that what constrains the free agency of those who are poor, 
uneducated or oppressed is almost always a lack of resources and options, rather than an actual inability 
to reflect on their choices. Respect for others' free agency will partly require benefactors to avoid these 
biases. 
 A third problematic effect involves the loss of self-esteem that can result when we depend on 
someone else to meet our central needs or ends. This is more likely when we depend on someone who 
does not fully respect us. It can be difficult to remain utterly unaffected by the subtle attitudes of someone 
who has significant power over our lives but does not hold us in esteem. However, self-esteem can be 
affected in conditions of inequality when we are not being actively disrespected, simply as a result of 
one's powerlessness in comparison to others, and the inability to act effectively when resources are 
absent.  
 Rawls ties self-respect (self-esteem) to others’ appreciation of one’s individual abilities and 
talents and refers to the conception that is of concern here:  
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First…it  
includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, 
his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s 
ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.20 
When conditions do not allow people the opportunity to fulfill their intentions (as when resources for 
autonomy of action are curtailed), this can erode their confidence in their own agency. Rawls’ inclusion 
of the bases of self-respect among the primary goods suggests a concern similar to the one raised here. 
Someone’s confidence in her ability to realize her end can be conceived of as a resource or good—
                                                 
19 For an example of a change in the social status of women brought about by their access to and control 
of water, see Jeffrey Rothfeder, Every Drop for Sale, (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 80-84. 
20  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 440. See also 
pp. 178-182, 440-446.  
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something she needs to carry out her conception of the good. Interference with her ability to use or access 
this good interferes not only with her ability to carry out her aims but also with her tendency to make 
future plans. The plans we make are shaped by our view that we can realize them. Even the options that 
occur to us will narrow considerably when we lose faith in our efficacy as agents. 
We have reason to object both to disrespect and to the active undermining of our free agency.  
These objections arise in several scenarios. 1. We object to someone who interferes with the result of our 
action. 2. We object to someone who interferes with our ability to act and judge freely, for example by 
restraining, deceiving or coercing us. 3. We object to someone who interferes with our ability to reflect on 
and realize our ends, if, for example, they reduce our efficacy by removing resources we need for future 
action, or undermine our self-esteem and thus make us lose confidence in our choices by attitudes of 
disrespect.  4. We object when someone creates an atmosphere in which it becomes difficult to choose 
rationally or authentically because they cause us to fear losing something of value.  The first and second 
scenarios tend to be the ones we initially think of as cases where free agency is not being respected or is 
being actively undermined. However, what has emerged in the discussion above is that the third and 
fourth scenarios can take place within acts of beneficence and may be made worse by the structure of 
beneficent relationships that involve dependence.  
2.  Conditions for Good Beneficence 
 A well-intentioned benefactor is someone who desires the well-being of the beneficiary and 
whose primary intention is to promote that person’s well-being. Two conditions ensure that such a 
benefactor performs good beneficence: 
 (1) The benefactor has genuine respect for the free agency of the beneficiary and intends to 
preserve the background conditions necessary for the beneficiary’s continued free agency. This feature is 
necessary (but not sufficient) to ensure that an atmosphere of problematic trade-offs does not develop and 
that the beneficiary’s self-esteem survives, and he has confidence that he can carry out ends in the future. 
 (2) Benefactors are morally and practically competent in the choice of means to the beneficiary’s 
ends.  What is meant here by moral competence is similar to what Aristotle means by phronesis, often 
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translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘practical intelligence’ in that both involve the skillful choice of 
effective and consistent means to ends.21  Most relevant to beneficence is the capacity to make three kinds 
of choices: (a) choose efficient means to the end; (b) choose means that are compatible with the pursuit of 
the beneficiary’s other values and ends; and (c) choose means that are compatible with other morally 
salient features of the situation, including effects on beneficiaries’ resources or self-esteem.  
The first two conditions for good beneficence require choosing means that are likely to bring 
about the end, do not have unnecessarily restrictive effects on the beneficiary’s other resources, and do 
not create unnecessary conflicts with or undermine the beneficiary’s other ends and values. The means 
must therefore fit within the beneficiary’s overall conception of her good.  The last condition includes the 
sensitivity to perceive and avoid factors that may create an atmosphere of pressure that leads a beneficiary 
to change her values or ends to secure beneficence.  These two criteria can be mutually supporting: The 
ability to convey respect to others also may depend on sensitivity to features of situations that can degrade 
or undermine the self-regard of those with whom one interacts. A sensitive person is capable of 
recognizing and anticipating her likely effect on others. Here, sensitivity is used in the ordinary sense to 
describe a person who is attentive to psychological and emotional facts relevant to her interaction with 
others, and whose perception of these facts tends to be accurate. Beneficence involving dependence often, 
but not always, involves imbalances of social and economic power and prestige. In such cases, dependent 
beneficiaries may be reluctant to speak up for fear of offending or alienating benefactors. In cases where 
social, cultural or class differences exist, a benefactor may also need to attend to these differences in order 
to better understand the effects that his choices and actions have on beneficiaries. Failure to attend to 
these differences was a significant problem for Schweitzer. Such conditions will exist in a variety of cases 
of beneficence. 
                                                 
21 Phronesis has some features that do not fit here. In particular, it is not the case that the benefactor must 
be fully virtuous or possess all the virtues. For a detailed discussion of phronesis and the unity of the 
virtues, see Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 66-
120.  For a discussion of the role of practical wisdom as the capacity to promote ends within a conception 
of one’s good, see Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
pp. 56-117.  
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 The conditions for good beneficence deserve some analysis, especially from the perspective of 
the beneficiary.  Respect may seem like an obvious condition for good beneficence, but the respect 
needed will demand more of us than the standard attitude of respect we must have towards others. 
Respect within beneficent relationships, as described here, naturally involves what we generally owe to 
others: recognition of their full moral equality, and acknowledgement of their right to control their own 
lives.22 A more demanding standard for respect in beneficent relationships arises however, because our 
actions may have a harmful effect on their ability to act freely. To avoid this, we often must understand a 
great deal about beneficiaries' lives.  Such understanding always requires open communication with 
beneficiaries, the ability to understand what they tell us, and a willingness to give credence to their own 
understanding of their lives.  
There are two reasons beneficence requires more than just a bare acknowledgement that others 
have the capacity and the right to reflect and choose freely. Beneficence often takes place when someone 
has significant need. In such cases, a person's ability to control her own life may already be compromised 
by poverty, injustice and oppression, or other external constraints on her resources. Thus, our effect on 
her resources must be carefully weighed. Second, her values and world view may be very different from 
our own, and so we must ensure we do not inadvertently impose our values upon her. Respect for free 
agency generally requires leaving people alone to control their own lives and let them realize their own 
ends. However, if we want to be good benefactors when someone's ability to realize her ends depends on 
us, we are required to consider whether there are conditions that prevent her from controlling her own life 
so that we do not exacerbate those conditions or otherwise worsen her situation. In some cases, fully 
respecting a person includes regretting injustices or other misfortunes that have left her with little power 
to act on her own behalf and in significant need. If we fully value another person’s free agency, we will 
see as undesirable those things that unjustly threaten it. In beneficence, such attitudes must be 
                                                 
22 For a view of recognition respect, see Stephen Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88 (1977), pp. 
36-49. About recognition respect, Darwall says that “to say that persons are entitled to respect is to say 
that they are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that they are 
persons deliberating about what to do.”  
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accompanied by actions that prevent unnecessary constraints on her deliberation or action as the result of 
our own actions. Understanding prior constraints on people’s lives will be relevant to this effort. Failure 
to recognize relevant background conditions and constraints that affect the results of our action, for 
example, oppression, psychological effects of prior political and social violence, illness, or cultural norms 
greatly increases the likelihood that our action will be inappropriate or harmful. 
 In many cases, the agent herself has no significant power to change the fundamental conditions 
that hamper the beneficiary. The goal is at least to ensure that the agent’s help does not worsen people's 
current situation or unnecessarily constrain their options. It may demand too much of a benefactor to 
promote the free agency of beneficiaries by removing any unnecessary obstacles to their future action. It 
is a good thing to provide a limited benefit, e.g., in the form of material aid, as long as those benefits do 
not inadvertently worsen the person's situation. Still, the obstacles to a person's ability to control her life 
are sometimes a better target for beneficence than aid that meets physical needs alone. When benefactors 
can see the ways that a person's good is impaired by outside constraints she cannot herself address, they 
may be better able discover what the beneficiary most needs. For example, political or social 
empowerment can be as conducive to someone's long-term good as material aid.23 
 The aspect of respect that attends to someone's need to control her own life is one reason why 
unconscious biases, even on the part of well-meaning benefactors, can so impair the ability to act well. 
One such attitude is to (perhaps unconsciously) blame beneficiaries for their difficulties or to see relative 
powerlessness as casting doubt on their right to control their own lives. Of course, some beneficiaries 
might be partly to blame for their difficulties, but almost never does this remove their right to control their 
own lives. Avoiding such biases does have a performative aspect. Wherever possible, beneficiaries should 
try to place those they help into a relationship of actual equality, at least in the context of communication. 
Thus, they must avoid inadvertently intimidating beneficiaries or otherwise keeping them from speaking 
on their own behalf. If you intend to help people, they should have some sense of control over the actions 
                                                 
23 These are often connected in that greater material resources can sometimes increase social and political 
standing. However, it is usually better to structure material aid in such a way that it promotes social and 
political standing. 
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you perform. Clearly, they should be able to forbid you from choosing means to ends that are contrary to 
their values (which would be paternalistic in any case); you are also under some (limited) burden to at 
least consider providing help they might desire more than the help you are offering.  
The second condition for good beneficence is moral and practical competence. Most well-
intentioned attempts at beneficence deserve praise, even when not ideal. Even so, we must admit that acts 
of beneficence can be better or worse or can fail altogether. You are better off if I prevent your starvation 
through my famine relief program. But if I flood your region with so much cheap grain that it undermines 
the local economy, I can threaten not only your future ability to support yourself but also your range of 
choices later.  
It's worth asking what beneficiaries can do to protect themselves. The idea that benefactors will 
choose harmful means to meet someone's self-chosen ends might lead us to ask whether beneficiaries 
could more effectively control the help that benefactors provide.  Suppose that contractual or quasi-
contractual arrangements clearly stating the terms of the help were possible. Would these protect 
beneficiaries? One reason these would be of little use to beneficiaries is that effective contracts require 
sanctions. Further, when we count on the benefactor’s greater knowledge or competence in certain 
spheres, we often cannot assess beforehand whether he will act competently. In rare cases, we can closely 
direct the help we receive, but we will nearly always have to trust, or at least rely on, our benefactor.24  
Thus, even if contracts were practical, they would not prevent harmful beneficence. Often, we cannot 
precisely set out what it is we want a benefactor to do for us because we need the benefactor’s expertise. 
We may also develop a long-term relationship with a benefactor who must be authorized to work 
independently (as was true in the Schweitzer case) and we cannot begin each day laying out constraints 
on the benefactor’s action. In general, beneficiaries must rely on benefactors’ knowledge, ability and 
                                                 
24 In Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 116-117, Annette Baier 
emphasizes that contracts are not good models on which to base consent to risky relationships because 
contracts are explicit and depend on sanctions for their enforcement. Legal and even social sanctions 
cannot be brought to bear on those who fail to treat one with respect. Even actual contracts do not wholly 
eliminate the risk or the need for trust. For the difference between trust and reliance, see Karen Jones, 
“Trust as an Affective Attitude,” Ethics 107 (1996), pp. 4-42.  
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competence to choose well. A benefactor often has access to things of great value to beneficiaries, and 
they usually cannot absolutely guarantee by their own actions that the benefactor’s actions will conform 
to their values or result in something that promotes their good.  
In addition, benefactors often have to act independently and without consultation; in doing so 
they can unintentionally interfere with, undermine or disrespect free agency. Although non-paternalistic 
benefactors do not choose the end, it may be necessary for them to choose the means to the end. For 
example, Mary has a young son and has long been trying to arrange a more flexible schedule so she can 
spend more time with him. However, her boss, Ted, dislikes Mary, regards her as a troublemaking 
feminist, and refuses to allow her to alter her schedule. Suppose that Lou, Mary’s good friend, is much 
better at negotiating with Ted than Mary is. Lou offers to intercede for Mary. He comes back and tells her 
that Ted has reconsidered; Mary can leave the office by 3:00 P.M. each day provided she remains in 
phone contact.  
Mary is delighted. However, when Lou recounts his conversation with Ted, Mary realizes that 
Lou primarily appealed to Ted’s sexism by emphasizing that Mary is on the verge of being an inadequate 
mother by working in the first place. Mary is particularly distressed because she realizes Ted’s new 
perspective on her may mean she is even less likely to get the challenging work assignments she craves or 
a promotion to a position with greater responsibility. Lou was well-meaning but failed to account for 
Mary’s other ends and the way these are now affected by the means he has chosen. Mary could not have 
told Lou how to negotiate with Ted, as the ability to relate to Ted is the very thing she lacks. She could 
not have chosen the precise means to her end. At the same time, Lou’s choice of means was not apt. In 
this case Mary’s overall free agency is not greatly compromised—but some of her other ends have been 
jeopardized and her options will now be much more limited. 
The example shows that the character and competence of benefactors unavoidably play a 
significant role in good beneficence. Benefactors need skill in realizing ends but also must be able to see 
how those means fit within beneficiaries’ outlook and conception of the good. Choosing the right means 
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depends on having reliably good judgment in the situation and in attending to other elements in the 
beneficiary’s conception of her good. 
That beneficiaries must depend on benefactors to choose the means to their ends raises several 
problems. First, the benefactor may choose inexact or inapt means to the beneficiary’s end. But two cases 
can be even more significant. In the first case, the benefactor chooses means that conflict with other 
significant ends in the beneficiary’s conception of her good. In the second, the benefactor chooses means 
that undermine resources the beneficiary needs to pursue her other ends in the future.  
In the Schweitzer case, bringing about a beneficiary’s self-chosen ends was not sufficient for 
good beneficence. Schweitzer provided the Gabonese with things they clearly valued: control of disease, 
better health, access to food, and basic education. But the help he offered conflicted with their other ends 
and values, such as eliminating colonialism or developing their own medical and technical skills—so he 
may have worsened their future prospects. His actions are objectionable not only because some of his 
actions inadvertently conflicted with his beneficiaries’ values and ends; he also undermined their 
confidence and other resources crucial to their ability to act on choices in the future. And he 
unintentionally disrespected them by giving them the impression that they could secure his continued help 
by conforming their values and actions to his apparent preferences. A deep attitude of respect is a 
powerful motivation to take up the challenge of trying to learn enough about others to prevent one’s 
attempts to help from having harmful side effects. Unfortunately, some people who care deeply about 
promoting others’ good are practically inept, and unable to choose the better option in complex 
circumstances. (One kind of competence that might still be useful for such people is the ability to see that 
you are not the right person for the job.) It is easy for benevolent and kind agents to harm others 
inadvertently, particularly if those others have markedly different life circumstances or world views.25 
                                                 
25 The practices of beneficent institutions and agencies suggest an awareness of this problem. The training 
they provide is partly an attempt to avoid the common mistakes of beneficence. When individuals 
volunteer, for example, in a homeless or battered women's shelter, they are frequently required to undergo 
some period of education in order to deepen their comprehension of the issues the clients face and prevent 
attitudes of paternalism and blame. Some agencies also require interviews with potential volunteers, 
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This is sometimes a benign problem when we help people with substantial resources to meet their own 
ends, but the results for vulnerable beneficiaries can be tragic.  
 Because I have shown that the responsibility of benefactors to prevent harm to beneficiaries can 
be substantial, we might worry this will weaken the motivation for beneficence. Many people’s well-
being depends on second-order beneficence, primarily in the form of donations to agencies, advocacy 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It’s not hard to imagine a casual 
philanthropist concluding, ‘if I have to do all that work, then forget it.’ People's interest in such distant 
beneficence, particularly toward the most vulnerable, can be weak. Judith Lichtenberg offers many 
reasons why people do not give, including the fact that distance causes the suffering of others to become 
abstract to us.26 Further, she argues, the language of moral obligation “sticks in people's craw,” which 
suggests that adding to their obligation might deter them further.27 This would be troubling, given that so 
many people depend, indirectly, on the help that donations make possible.28 
 However, casual second-order beneficence brings with it a much lighter responsibility than direct 
engagement in beneficent relationships. A second-order benefactor’s own actions do not impede a 
beneficiary's ability to deliberate and they are not directly involved in choosing the means. The 
beneficiaries are unlikely to be aware of the donors’ attitudes towards them and their deliberation and 
choices are affected very indirectly by the donors’ actions, which merely make the direct benefactor’s 
actions possible.    
 Nevertheless, such donors do have some responsibilities to those who depend indirectly on their 
donations because the donation may facilitate beneficence that may harm others. As always, what they 
                                                                                                                                                             
partly to screen out inappropriate people but also to ensure some level of respect and moral competence 
among volunteers. 
26 Judith Lichtenberg, “Absence and the Unfond Heart: Why People Are Less Giving Than They Might 
Be,” in Chatterjee, The Ethics of Assistance, pp. 75-100.  
27 Lichtenberg, p. 79. 
28 Note that many cases where beneficence is called for are cases of injustice. In particular, NGOs often 
focus on local and global injustice. Ameliorating injustice in a public way is a higher priority than private 
beneficence and it is far better if the harms of injustice that benefactors try to address are removed 
through instituting justice itself. However, in situations where this is not likely to occur, beneficence is 
still necessary. 
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ought to do depends on what they can do. In most cases, people engaged in secondary giving can look 
carefully at how a given organization conceives of its work and consider whether it shows both a high 
degree of respect for those it intends to benefit and an appropriate level of concern for its effects on them. 
Organizations such as Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, Partners in Health, Human Rights Watch and 
many others make a significant amount of material available to potential donors. It does not place a great 
burden on us to read that material before deciding to donate. Donors can also consult with reliable, well-
informed people (e.g., those who engage in direct beneficence in the relevant area or those knowledgeable 
about the region or issue) about where to put their money. 
 Further, second-order benefactors can avoid being paternalistic or pitying as they think of the 
poor or vulnerable that their donations are intended to benefit, as such thinking denies people’s agency. 
These attitudes about the poor proliferate mostly because of the way poverty is presented to us and our 
distance from the poor, so some potential donors may need further education to let go of such attitudes. 
Those who are worse off still have views about how they want to live their lives, and these must be 
respected, even if such thinking dissuades people who would be more strongly motivated by pity. The 
best aid organizations, for example, present the people they help as distinct individuals rather than mere 
objects of pity. Wanting to ensure that the work one is supporting increases people's ability to control 
their lives and lead a life they would choose does motivate many potential donors to look closely at the 
organizations they support. 
 Does increasing the second-order donor's responsibility even this much deter people from giving? 
To answer this question, consider two people. The first would be the person who is already concerned 
about helping the poor, the vulnerable or others who are unable to satisfy their ends without help. Such a 
person is unlikely to be dissuaded by the responsibility to make a reasonable inquiry to see that her 
money is doing good, rather than harm. A second sort of person may want to give but guilt or other 
discomfort keeps her from thinking for long about the conditions of people's lives or their suffering. There 
might be some reason for NGOs to try to reduce this person’s discomfort or otherwise make it easy for 
them to donate. However, this does not mean we also must let them off the moral hook entirely. Although 
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people like these may do some good through their donations, they do so primarily by accident and are 
evading a rather undemanding moral responsibility.  Further, it may matter less than we might think if 
people do not give when the result is that bad philanthropies are deprived of donations. If casual 
philanthropists give to organizations that are utterly unconcerned about the free agency of the recipients 
of their donations, those recipients may ultimately not benefit much from that organization’s work or may 
be harmed by it.29  
3. Conclusion 
My argument has been that the conditions for good beneficence include more than the goodwill 
and good intention of benefactors. Even a benefactor’s success at bringing about the ends a beneficiary 
has chosen may be insufficient for good beneficence. Success at realizing the beneficiary’s ends is 
insufficient when that benefactor chooses means that thwart or are incompatible with other elements in 
the beneficiary’s conception of her good, undermine resources needed for future autonomy, or show 
disrespect for the beneficiary. Even so, I concede that in certain pressing cases, some beneficence will be 
better than no beneficence. You may be better off if I save your life while also undermining your ability 
to pursue your future ends or if I disrespect you but give you something you desperately need. Even when 
the benefactor is disrespectful or incompetent, the benefit to the beneficiary can outweigh the harm.  
 However, harmful beneficence is only sometimes better than no beneficence at all and it is 
equally possible that, in the long run, harms even to very needy beneficiaries will outweigh benefits. 
Although it can sometimes be better for a person to receive harmful beneficence, we cannot be sanguine 
about the problems it raises. One reason why the benefit will sometimes outweigh the harm lies in 
individuals’ very dire need for assistance, particularly in situations of deprivation and injustice. Those in 
great need must sometimes accept beneficence even when they know harms will accompany it. 
                                                 
29 Amy Wilentz describes several harmful economic effects of CARE’s work in Haiti in the 1980s. For 
example, CARE oversaw the eradication of wild pigs to reduce disease and started an imported piglet 
program. However, they allowed large landowners to control the distribution of the imported piglets. The 
landowners charged a high price for them, which further impoverished peasant farmers who had 
depended on the wild pigs for food. See The Rainy Season: Haiti Since Duvalier, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1989), pp. 243-265. 
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Substantially free agency may be a luxury some may relinquish when the help they receive is better than 
nothing. This is not a happy result though, and we should not be satisfied with it. We should be no more 
comfortable with a benefactor who unnecessarily undermines a beneficiary’s free agency than we are with 
a doctor who amputates an infected limb when antibiotics alone would have saved it. Even in emergency 
situations, e.g., where saving someone's life does not leave time to consider her existing resources or her 
conception of her good, her eventual need for free agency cannot be fully set aside, but only temporarily 
overridden. Our moral standard for beneficence, like our medical standard for good care, should represent 
a set of ‘best practices’ even if we relax our standards in urgent cases.  
 Respect and competence are the primary agent-dependent conditions for good beneficence. Not 
every potential beneficent agent is able to satisfy these conditions. Some elements of competence may lie 
outside the will. And, although a basic attitude of respect for others is a minimum moral requirement on 
us, the significant effect we can have on beneficiaries’ ability to choose and act freely requires more than 
mentally acknowledging the fact that they have the right to control their own lives. To prevent harm to 
others within beneficent relationships, full respect for others’ free agency requires us to understand their 
lives and to act in ways that adequately reflect this understanding. We are familiar with the very real 
worry that far too many people are indifferent to the well-being of others. I have argued for a more 
unexpected worry: Some people are unwilling or unable to sufficiently understand the circumstances and 
perspective of others and, when this is the case, even those with a deep desire to do good are likely to do 
unwitting harm. This argument here suggests that the desire to help is not precisely the opposite of 
indifference. Someone who genuinely desires to benefit another can still display a kind of indifference to 
that person’s free agency and in doing so, may neglect what is most important to the person herself.30 
 
                                                 
30 I wish to thank Bernard Nickles, Lawrence Blum, Sally Haslanger, Karen Jones, Terence Irwin, Allen 
Wood, Susanna Siegel, Jessica Wilson, Eric Hiddelston, Jennifer Whiting, Christopher Sturr and Sigurdur 
Kristinsson for helpful comments on this paper. 
 
